Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and
Judicial Elections: Application and Remedy
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Until recently, the question of whether § 2 of the Voting
Rights Act 1 applies to judicial elections seemed to have been resolved. Both the Fifth and Sixth Circuits had considered the issue
and decided that the scope of § 2 was broad enough to encompass
judicial elections.2 The Attorney General of the United States and
the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department agreed with
this conclusion.3 Most district courts that had been presented with
the issue also agreed that § 2 applied with full force to elected
judges. 4 Commentators assumed that the issue was settled.5
The Fifth Circuit resurrected the controversy with its en banc
opinion in League of United Latin American Citizens -("LULAC")
v Clements.6 The majority held that § 2 of the Act did not apply to
judicial elections.' This holding was founded on the argument that
the language of § 2(b), which provides that § 2 is violated when
protected minorities "have less opportunity than other members of

t B.A. 1988, Fordham University; J.D. Candidate 1991, The University of Chicago.
2 42 USC § 1973 (1988). Section 2(a) provides in relevant part:
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure
shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which
results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to
vote on account of race or color...
For the relevant text of § 2(b), see text at note 27.
2 League of United Latin American Citizens v Clements, 902 F2d 293 (5th Cir 1990),
rev'd, 914 F2d 620 (5th Cir 1990) (en bane), cert granted, 111 S Ct 775 (1991); Mallory v
Ryrich, 839 F2d 275 (6th Cir 1988); Chisom v Edwards, 839 F2d 1056 (5th Cir 1988).
1 Chisom, 839 F2d at 1064.
4 See, for example, Williams v State Board of Elections, 696 F Supp 1563, 1565-66 (N
D IMl1988).
' See, for example, Note, Casting a Meaningful Ballot: Applying One-Person, OneVote to Judicial Elections Involving Racial Discrimination, 98 Yale L J 1193, 1194-95
(1989); Note, Applying Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act to Single Member Offices, 88
Mich L Rev 2199, 2200 n 8 (1990). For further commentary see 73 Judicature (Aug-Sept
1989) (special issue devoted to "The Voting Rights Act and Judicial Election").
6 914 F2d 620 (1990) (en banc). The Supreme Court heard oral argument in the case on
April 22, 1991, and an opinion is expected near the end of the current Term.
7 Id at 631.
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the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice," 8 simply does not extend to elected
judges.9 The'Court held that elected judges are not "representatives," and are therefore outside the scope of the statutory
language.
At first blush, the holding appears to make some sense. The
judicial role has traditionally been understood as quite different
from the roles of legislative or executive officials. Judges are meant
to be fair, unbiased, and insulated from the whims and will of the
people. Judges do not "represent" people in the same way that
other elected officials do. In fact, the federal courts have long held
that the one-person, one-vote doctrine does not apply to judicial
elections precisely because state judges "are not representatives in
the same sense as are legislators or the executive."' 10 The majority
in LULAC put great weight on this line of cases in deciding that
the language of § 2 did not reach judges." The court felt that because it was established that judges were not representatives for
purposes of the one-person, one-vote doctrine, judicial elections
could certainly not fall within the scope of the identical word as
used in § 2(b) of the Voting Rights Act.
The strength of the court's argument, however, which after all
hinges entirely on one word, begins to wane when one considers
not merely the word itself, but the context in which it is found.
This Comment argues that the relevant meaning of "representatives," as used in the Voting Rights Act, cannot be divined by
looking solely at the word in isolation, but must be informed by
the statutory structure and purpose. A full interpretive analysis
will reveal that the term "representatives" in § 2(b) is far broader
than the theory of representation that underlies the one-person,
one-vote cases. A discussion of these uses of the same word at different levels of generality will establish that while judges have
been exempted from the one person, one vote doctrine, the broad
language of § 2 nonetheless covers judicial elections.
After establishing that § 2 applies to judges, this Comment addresses the problem of formulating the proper remedy for a judicial districting scheme that has been held to violate § 2. Unique
difficulties are presented by the remedial phase of judicial election
" See text at note 27 for the full text of § 2(b).
9 LULAC, 914 F2d at 625-27.
'0 Wells v Edwards, 347 F Supp 453, 455 (1972), quoting Stokes v Forston, 234 F Supp
575, 577 (N D Ga 1964), aff'd, 409 US 1095 (1973).
11914 F2d at 624-29.
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cases under the Act. In fact, counter-textual interpretations of § 2
that exclude judges seem to be results-oriented approaches aimed
at avoiding the remedial problems presented by § 2's application to
judicial elections. Section III of this Comment analyzes the usual
remedy adopted in § 2 cases and argues that the typical "safe minority subdistrict" plan creates difficult problems of its own by
greatly aggravating the already substantial costs of selecting judges
by popular election. Section III concludes that perhaps the best
"remedy" in these cases is for the states to choose to return to an
appointive system of judicial selection. If designed and implemented properly, the appointment remedy will serve the purposes
of § 2 and result in a more effective state judiciary.

I.

THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT

A discussion of § 2's applicability to the judiciary must be
founded on an understanding of the structure and purpose of the
original statutory scheme, as well as the various subsequent
amendments. This Section first discusses the structure of the original Act. Next, it analyzes the vote dilution decisions of the Supreme Court and the role of the Voting Rights Act in those decisions. Then it outlines the 1982 congressional amendments to § 2
that are the subject of the current controversy involving the Act's
application to judges. Finally, the Section surveys the cases that
deal with the issue of applying § 2 to judicial elections.
A.

The Structure of the Act

Congress passed the original Voting Rights Act in 1965,12 pursuant to § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment," and amended the Act
in 1970, 1975, and 1982.1' The original Act implemented several
mechanisms aimed at eliminating persistent discrimination in voting. Perhaps most importantly, § 4 of the Act prohibited the use of
literacy tests and other devices or requirements that had been used
primarily to prevent blacks from voting. 15 The use of such devices
" Pub L No 89-110, 79 Stat 437 (1965).
" The Fifteenth Amendment provides:
Section 1: The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any state on account of race, color, or previous
condition of involuntary servitude.
Section 2: The Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by appropriate

legislation.
"

Pub L No 91-285, 84 Stat 314 (1970); Pub L No 94-73, 86 Stat 402 (1975); Pub L No

97-205, 96 Stat 134 (1982).
Is 42 USC § 1973b.
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was immediately suspended in any political subdivision that maintained such tests or devices as of November 1, 1964, and in which
less than fifty percent of the voting population was registered to
vote on that date or in which less than fifty percent of voting-age
persons voted in the 1964 presidential election.
In addition, political subdivisions exhibiting these characteristics ("covered jurisdictions") were subject to the preclearance provisions of § 5, which required that any changes in voting practices
or procedures be submitted to either, the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia or the Attorney General for review. 6 The Act also authorized the Attorney General to use federal
observers and examiners in covered jurisdictions when necessary.' 7
The Act provided a "bailout" procedure by which political subdivisions could remove themselves from the coverage of the "triggered" provisions of the Voting Rights Act. 8
In contrast to the provisions that applied only to covered jurisdictions, § 2 of the 1965 Act contained a general prohibition
against discriminatory voting practices that applied to the entire
nation. 9 As originally enacted, § 2 was viewed as "an uncontroversial provision in proposed legislation whose other provisions engendered protracted disputes."2 0 Section 2 merely elaborated on the
language of the Fifteenth Amendment and "was intended to have
an effect no different from that of the Fifteenth Amendment
' 21
itself."
B.

The Racial Vote Dilution Cases and the Voting Rights Act

During the 1970s, the Supreme Court began dealing specifically with the issue of racial vote dilution. Plaintiffs in the vote
dilution cases challenged electoral schemes under the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments and under § 2 of the Voting Rights
Act. These cases evaluated certain electoral devices, such as atlarge electoral systems and multimember voting districts, that satisfied the Equal Protection Clause's requirement of substantial

16

42 USC § 1973c.
6, 42 USC § 1973d.

17 Section

1 Section 4(a), 42 USC § 1973b(a).
19 Pub L No 89-110, 79 Stat 437 (1965). The original § 2 provided that: "No voting
qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed
or applied by any State or political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of
the United States to vote on account of race or color . . .
20 Mobile v Bolden, 446 US 55, 61 (1980).
21

Id at 60-61.
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equality of population among districts, but were alleged to unlawfully dilute the voting power of minority groups.
The Supreme Court vote dilution decisions hinged primarily
on the issue of whether the Constitution or § 2 of the Act required
a showing of intentional discrimination, or if it was sufficient that
the scheme had discriminatory "results." There was some initial
confusion regarding the proper standard of proof. In White v
Regester,2 2 for example, the Court seemed to implement a discriminatory results test, rather than requiring strict proof of discriminatory intent. In Mobile v Bolden,23 however, the Supreme Court
made clear the standard of proof for racial vote dilution violations
of the Constitution and § 2. The Court held that the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments, as well as § 2, required a showing of
discriminatory purpose by those who developed or operated the
voting system at issue.24 This holding led Congress to amend § 2 in
1982.
Congress rejected the intent test in its amendments to § 2.25
The battle over the amendments dealt principally with the issue of
which standard of proof should be adopted. Both the House and
the Senate ultimately chose the "results" test. The Senate Judiciary Committee's version of § 2, engineered primarily by Senator
Robert Dole, came to be known as the "Dole Compromise." The
Senate bill preserved the "results" standard adopted in the House
bill, but added § 2(b) in order to clarify the scope and application
of the new test.
Section 2(b) codified the test for vote dilution originally articulated by the Supreme Court in White v Regester. In White, the
Court held that to establish the existence of prohibited vote dilution, plaintiffs would have to prove, based on the "totality of the
circumstances," that "the political processes leading to nomination
and election were not equally open to participation by the group in
question-that its members had less opportunity than did other
residents in the district to participate in the political processes and
to elect legislators of their choice." 2 The Senate committee incorporated this language directly into § 2(b), substituting the word
"representatives" for "legislators." Congress ultimately passed the

21412 US 755 (1973).
22 446 US 55 (1980).
24 Id at 62, 66.
21 Pub L No 97-205, 96 Stat 134 (1982).
26 412 US at 769, 776.
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Senate version of § 2(b), which allowed proof of a violation of § 2
upon a showing that
the political processes leading to nomination or election in the
State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) of this section in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the
political process and to elect representatives of their choice.
Thornburg v Gingles28 presented the Supreme Court with the
task of interpreting and applying the newly enacted results test. In
Gingles, the Court reviewed the Senate Report, which listed a variety of factors typically relevant to a § 2 claim, including the history
of discrimination in the state and the extent to which minority
candidates have been elected. 29 The Court stressed, however, that

this list was not exhaustive, nor was a plaintiff required to prove
any particular number of these factors. According to the Court, the
hallmark of a § 2 violation is that "a bloc voting majority must
usually be able to defeat candidates supported by a politically cohesive, geographically insular minority group." 30
C.

Case Law on Judicial Elections and Section 2

Since 1982, the federal courts have used the results test to
strike down several districting plans that resulted in racial vote dilution.3 ' Recently, the courts have addressed § 2 suits attacking
27 42 USC § 1973b.
28 478 US 30 (1986).
2 Id at 44-45. The Court stated that the Senate Report required an analysis of the

following factors in § 2 cases:
...the history of voting related discrimination in the State or political subdivision; the
extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political subdivision is racially
polarized; the extent to which the state or political subdivision has used voting practices or procedures that tend to enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the
minority group, such as unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements,
and prohibitions against bullet voting; the exclusion of members of the minority group
from the candidate slating process; the extent to which minority group members bear
the effects of past discrimination in areas such as education, employment, and health,
which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process; the use of
overt or subtle racial appeals in political campaigns; and the extent to which members
of the minority group have been elected to ,public office in the jurisdiction.
Id. In addition, "evidence demonstrating that elected officials are unresponsive to the particularized needs of the members of the minority group and the policy underlying the state's
... contested practice or structure may have probative value." Id.
30 Id at 48-49 (emphasis in original).
31 See, for example, East Jefferson Coalition for Leadership and Development v Parish
of Jefferson, 703 F Supp 28 (E D La 1989), aff'd, 926 F2d 487 (5th Cir 1991); Citizens for a
Better Gretna v City of Gretna, 834 F2d 496 (5th Cir 1987), reh'g den, 849 F2d 1471 (1988),
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judicial election schemes. 2 Most courts have ruled that the language of § 2 covers judicial elections. Three courts, however, have
disagreed. Before they were reversed by their respective circuits,
two district courts held that § 2 did not apply to judges because
judges are not "representatives." ' 3 More recently, in LULAC, the
Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc and reversing two Fifth Circuit panel
decisions,-4 also held § 2 inapplicable to judicial elections. 5 The
majority opinion reopened what had been a settled issue in every
circuit that had considered the question,- including the Fifth.
Before LULAC, the two most prominent cases on point were
Chisom v Edwards8 and Mallory v Eyrich.3 7 In both cases the district courts ruled that § 2 did not apply to judges, because judges
could not be included within any possible definition of the statutory term "representatives." The district courts relied primarily on
the one person, one vote cases 3 arguing that since that doctrine
did not apply to judges, § 2 likewise could not apply.39
The Fifth and Sixth Circuits both reversed. Both courts argued that reliance on only one word obfuscated the issue, and that
an examination of the structure and history of the Voting Rights
Act as well as its practical application was essential to the interpretive question. According to the courts of appeals, the plain language of the Act, the policies behind the enactment of § 2, pertinent legislative history, and previous interpretations of § 5 of the
Act all supported applying § 2 to judicial elections.4 °
The Fifth Circuit's original panel opinion in LULAC agreed
with the Sixth Circuit and reaffirmed Chisom, applying § 2 to
cert denied, 109 S Ct 3213 (1989); Campos v City of Baytown, Texas, 840 F2d 1240 (5th Cir
1988).
3' Plaintiffs have challenged state judicial election systems in several states, mostly in
the South. See, for example, Clark v Edwards, 725 F Supp 285 (M D La 1988); Chisom v
Edwards, 659 F Supp 183 (E D La 1988), rev'd, 839 F2d 1056 (5th Cir 1988), cert denied as
Roemer v Chisom, 109 S Ct 390 (1988); Brooks v State Board of Elections, 1989 US Dist
LEXIS 16357 (S D Ga); Williams v State Board of Elections, 696 F Supp 1563 (N D Ill
1988); Southern ChristianLeadership Conference of Alabama v State of Alabama, 714 F
Supp 511 (M D Ala 1988); Mallory v Eyrich, 666 F Supp 1060, rev'd, 839 F2d 275 (6th Cir
1988); Martin v Mabus, 700 F Supp 327 (S D Miss 1988).
33 Chisom, 659 F Supp at 186; Mallory, 666 F Supp at 1064.
34 Chisom, 839 F2d 1056; LULAC, 902 F2d 293.
35 LULAC, 914 F2d 620.
3 839 F2d 1056.
37 839 F2d 275.
33 The one person, one vote doctrine is discussed in Section II.C.
39 Chisom, 659 F Supp at 185-86; Mallory, 666 F Supp at 1063-64.
40 Mallory, 839 F2d at 278-81; Chisom, 839 F2d at 1059-64.
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judges. 41 On rehearing en banc, however, the Fifth Circuit reversed
the panel determinations in both Chisom and LULAC. The en
banc majority's reasoning tracked that of-the Chisom and Mallory
district courts, with particular emphasis on the one person, one
vote line of cases. 42 The court argued that those cases are "not only
instructive as to the meaning of 'representatives' and thus as to the
scope of Section 2, [they are] . . . dispositive of the precise issue of
the scope of Section 2's applicability in this case. '43 A close look at
the one person, one vote doctrine will establish that this conclusion
is not supported by the case law. An examination of the statutory
arguments alone, however, is enough to support the conclusion
that § 2 applies to judges.
II.

SECTION

2's

APPLICATION TO JUDICIAL ELECTIONS

Ultimately, the question of whether § 2 applies to judicial
elections concerns the proper level of generality to ascribe to the
word "representatives" as used in that section. Those who argue
for the exemption of judicial elections from § 2 assign a narrow
level of meaning to the term, reading "representatives" to exclude
judges. Several factors, including statutory purpose, context, and
structure, contradict such a restrictive interpretation and support
defining the term at a broader level of generality.
It is impossible to resolve the debate over the meaning of the
word "representatives" in the abstract. The interpretive task is to
divine the relevant and most plausible level of meaning, given context and purpose. In some sense, albeit not in the same sense as a
legislator, judges can be considered representatives.4 4 The position
that § 2 excludes judges ultimately rests on the 'idea that "to sug41 The Chisom case dealt with a challenge to state appellate judicial districts in Texas.

In LULAC, the plaintiffs challenged the at-large election of state trial judges under § 2(b).
The majority concluded that § 2 applied, but relied on the distinction between single-member and multimember offices to ultimately hold that § 2(b) did not apply to trial judges,
since that office is exercised exclusively by one individual. This distinction is discussed in
text at notes 102-05.
42 LULAC, 914 F2d at 627.

43 Id.
" In the words of Judge Higginbotham:
It is true that judges do not carry the views of a certain group of people into a larger
governmental body, attempting to sway that body toward decisions favorable to their
constituency. That is not the necessary role of a representative. We extol the virtues of
the jury in criminal cases-the jury is said to be the representatives of the lieople ....

The examples can be multiplied, but the point is plain. The conclusion that the word

'representative' has the singular meaning of legislator is nothing more than an effort to

substitute judicial will for that of Congress.
Id at 636 (Higginbotham concurring) (footnotes and citations omitted; emphasis in original).
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gest that Congress chose 'representatives' with the intent of including judges is roughly on a par with suggesting that the term
night may, in a given circumstance, properly be read to include
5
day.")N
"Night" and "day," of course, are polar opposites; they are
mutually exclusive. But this is not the relationship between the
term "representatives" as used in § 2 and the elected judiciary. At
some level, however broad, the former includes the latter.
This Section demonstrates that the word "representatives"
was meant in its general and not restricted sense. Statutory purpose and structure as well as the legislative history support this
conclusion. The Section then responds to the argument that the
one person, one vote cases require exempting judges from § 2.
A.

The Structure and Purpose of the Voting Rights Act

The purpose of § 2 is to protect the right of minorities to participate equally in the election process. This right is implicated
whenever there is an election, whether it involves legislators or
judges. Nothing in the language of the Voting Rights Act suggests
that the importance of the right to vote depends on the duties of
the particular official being elected. Nor is there anything inherent
in the nature of the judiciary that should exempt these elections
from the guarantees afforded minorities by § 2.
An examination of the broader structure of the Act-§ 5 in
particular-also supports the conclusion that § 2 applies to the judiciary. Section 5 requires covered jurisdictions to preclear changes
in "any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard,
practice, or procedure .... ", The preclearance review must ensure
that the proposed change "does not have the purpose and will not
have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account
of race. ' 47 In Allen v State Board of Elections, the Supreme Court
rejected a narrow construction of § 5 and held that "[t]he legislative history on the whole supports the view that Congress intended
to reach any state enactment which altered the election law of a
covered State in even a minor way.""' The Court interpreted § 5 in
'
order to give the Act "the broadest possible scope. 49
The broad scope of the § 5 preclearance provision has been
extended to the judiciary. In 1985, a three-judge court in Haith v
LULAC, 914 F2d at 629 (emphasis in original).
42 USC § 1973(c).
47 Id.
8 393 US 544, 566 (1969).
45
46

41

Id at 567.
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Martin" held that "the fact that an election law deals with the
election of members of the judiciary does not remove it from the
ambit of section 5." 51 This holding was affirmed by the Supreme
Court.2 The defendants in Haith based their arguments, as do the
current § 2 defendants, on the line of cases that found one person,
one vote inapplicable to judges. The Haith court, however, rejected
53
the distinction, made in the one person, one vote cases,
between those in the legislative branch of government who represent their constituents in the making of laws and those in
the judicial branch who do not represent a constituency but,
rather, interpret the law. Discounting the interesting jurisprudential arguments arising from such an attempted distinction
it is quite clear that no such distinction can be attributed to
the Act. 4
The court then cited the broad language of § 2(a) and stated: "[a]s
can be seen the Act applies to all voting without any limitation as
to who, or what, is the object of the vote. '5' 5 The Haith court rejected the argument that the one person, one vote cases shed light
on the proper interpretation of the Voting Rights Act. Further, by
holding § 5 applicable to judges, the decision supports applying § 2
to judicial elections as well.
The Haith decision requires extending § 2 to judges in order
to avoid creating an anomaly in the statute. If judges are deemed
outside the scope of § 2, then an election scheme that would be
subject to § 5 preclearance if presented as a change could not be
challenged under § 2, even if it resulted in minority vote dilution.5"
The nearly identical language of the two sections and the complementary nature of their purposes suggest that both apply to judicial elections.
Further, the fact that § 5 applies only to covered jurisdictions
while § 2 applies universally does not support the conclusion that
§ 2 need not cover judges even though § 5 does. This only high-

"
"
52

618 F Supp 410 (E D NC 1985).
618 F Supp at 413. See also Kirksey v Allain, 635 F Supp 347 (S D Miss 1986).

477 US 901 (1986).

5 See Section II.C.
618 F Supp at 413 (citation omitted).
5' Id (emphasis in original).
56 "Such a result would be totally inconsistent with the broad remedial purpose of the
Act. Moreover, section 5 and section 2, virtually companion sections, operate in tandem to
prohibit discriminatory practices in voting, whether those practices originate in the past,
present, or future." Chisom, 839 F2d at 1064. See also LULAC, 914 F2d at 645 (Higginbotham concurring).
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lights the inconsistency that such an interpretation would create.
First, as described above, in covered jurisdictions changes to judicial election schemes would have to be precleared, but existing districts could not be challenged under § 2 even if they resulted in
vote dilution. In addition, jurisdictions not covered by § 5 could
operate judicial election plans that diluted minority votes, and
could also implement changes that resulted in increased dilution,
as long as plaintiff's could not prove discriminatory intent.
Alternatively, one could argue that since the test to be applied
under § 5 is different from the § 2 results test,57 one can apply to
the judiciary at the same time that the other does not. But any
such distinction is irrelevant to the question of whether § 2 applies
to judges, as § 5 does. The subtle difference between the two tests
does not affect their coextensive coverage of every other kind of
election, and there is no relevant characteristic of the judiciary
that would argue in favor of making one or the other test inapplicable. Such arguments were rejected when they were made to restrict the scope of § 5 from covering the judiciary, and they must
be rejected again with regard to § 2 for the same reasons.5 8
B.

The Legislative History

The language, purpose, and structure of the statute, standing
alone, are enough to support § 2's application to judicial elections.
On matters involving the Voting Rights Act in general, and the
amended § 2 in particular, however, the Supreme Court has relied
heavily on legislative history. 59 This legislative history is consistent
with the conclusion that § 2 applies to judges.6 0
57 Under the § 5 test, preclearance will be denied to those changes in voting practices,
however minor, that have the purpose or the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote
because of race. The Supreme Court has construed the effects test of § 5 as prohibiting
those changes that would have a retrogressive effect on the voting strength of minorities.
Beer v United States, 425 US 130, 141 (1976). This "retrogression test" would strike down
only those voting changes that have a negative effect on the ability of minority groups to
participate in the political process and elect their candidates to office. Id. The § 5 test, of
course, applies only to the change being implemented and not to the entire election scheme.
Section 2's results test, on the other hand, applies to the entire existing electoral structure.
58 LULAC, 914 F2d at 645 (Higginbotham concurring).
59 See, for example, Gingles, 478 US at 36; Allen, 393 US at 566-68. Thomas M. Boyd
and Stephen J. Markman, The 1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights Act: A Legislative
History, 40 Wash & Lee L Rev 1347 (1983), is often cited as the definitive work on the
legislative history of the 1982 Amendments.
60 Dillardv Crenshaw County, Alabama, 831 F2d 246, 250-51 (11th Cir 1987) (Nothing
in the legislative history suggests that § 2's applicability depends on "the function performed by an elected official.").
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The text of the original § 2 was quite broad and had nationwide applicability, 6 ' and the Act defined the terms "vote" and
"voting" extremely broadly.6 2 It seems certain that judicial elections were covered by the language of § 2 as originally enacted.6
Although the language did not mention judicial elections specifically, the text was unequivocal. 4 Even in the Supreme Court's voting rights opinions, there is "no hint ... that any state or local
election, whatever the office involved, is exempted from coverage of
the 1965 Act.""6
As discussed, in 1982 Congress changed the language of § 2(a)
and added § 2(b) in order to replace the "intent" interpretation of
Mobile v. Bolden with a results test. Section 2(a) was amended to
preclude political subdivisions from imposing any voting procedure
in a manner "which results in a denial or abridgement of the right
of any citizen of the United States to vote ....
,66 Section 2(a)
otherwise retained the identical broad language it had contained
prior to the amendments. Section 2(b) was added to explain how a
violation of the new results test could be established. Congress
took the language of § 2(b) directly from the Supreme Court's
White v Regester opinion, merely replacing the term "legislators"
with the more expansive term "representatives." This change itself
supports the argument that Congress intended the scope of § 2(b)'s
explanation of the results test, codified in § 2(a), to parallel the
all-inclusive language of § 2(a). If § 2(a) applies to judges, § 2(b)
must then also apply; the results test is codified in § 2(a) and explained in § 2(b).

1 See note 19.

The terms include "all action necessary to make a vote effective in any primary,
special, or general election, including, but not limited to, registration, listing pursuant to
this subchapter, or other action required by law prerequisite to voting, casting a ballot, and
having such ballot counted properly and included in the appropriate totals of votes cast
with respect to candidates for public or party office and propositions for which votes are
received in an election." Section 14, 42 USC § 19731(c)(1).
82 In Allen, Chief Justice Warren argued that "[i]ndicative of an intention to give the
Act the broadest possible scope, Congress expanded the language in the final version of § 2
82

."

393 US at 566-67.

There is further support for the broad reading of the original § 2 in the Supreme
Court's Mobile v Bolden holding, which viewed § 2 as basically tracking the Fifteenth
Amendment. To say that the original § 2 did not apply to judges is to implicitly suggest
"that the protections of the Fifteenth Amendment do not extend to minorities whose right
to vote in judicial elections is abridged. The Fifteenth Amendment applies to all elections,
and Congress intended the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to apply to all elections." LULAC, 914
F2d at 637 (Higginbotham concurring).
01

Mallory, 839 F2d at 278.

e' 42 USC § 1973(a) (emphasis added).
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The purpose of the 1982 amendments was to make it easier to
prove minority vote dilution in violation of § 2, in light of Mobile v
Bolden's intent requirement.17 The argument that § 2 excludes
judges comes down to the assertion that although Congress did indeed expand the Act, it drew a statutory line exempting judges,
evidenced by the word "representatives" in § 2(b). The difficulty
with this argument is that there is no support for the contention
that the § 2 amendments involved a decision by Congress to specifically exempt the judiciary from a provision that had covered it all
along. There is practically no discussion of the judiciary in the history of the amendments, nor is there even the slightest hint that
the judiciary would be exempt from the new, more protective language of § 2. Such a suggestion would almost certainly have met
with a great deal of resistance, and Congress would have thoroughly debated such a change. Silence in the record on this point
supports the inference that Congress intended to continue the applicability of § 2 to judicial elections. The text of the amended version was changed only to the extent necessary to incorporate the
results test, and the new language can easily be read to include
judges. If this language was meant to effect not one, but two large
changes in the original provision, this would have been made clear
in either the record or the text, but probably both. The Senate
Report itself states that "Section 2 remains the major statutory
prohibition of all voting rights discrimination." 68
Congress used the word "representatives" interchangeably
with "candidates" and "elected officials" throughout the amendment process. 6 9 This suggests that Congress did not use "repre67 More precisely, Congress repudiated the intent test for 3 principal reasons:

. . . it is "unnecessarily divisive because it involves charges of racism on the part of
individual officials or entire communities," it places an "inordinately difficult" burden
of proof on plaintiffs, and it "asks the wrong question." The "right" question, as the
Report emphasizes repeatedly, is whether "as a result of the challenged practice or
structure plaintiffs do not have an equal opportunity to participate in the political process and elect candidates of their choice."
Thornburg v Gingles, 478 US 30, 44 (1985), quoting Senate Report at 36, 28 (emphasis
added).
6s Mallory, 839 F2d at 279, citing Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, S Rep No
97-417, 97th Congress, 2d Sess 30 (1982).
'9 See Mallory, 839 F2d at 279-80, for an exhaustive list of such examples appearing in
the record. Especially telling are the words of the author of the "Dole Compromise." Senator Dole explained:
Citizens of all races are entitled to have an equal chance of electing candidates of their
choice, but if they are fairly afforded that opportunity, and lose, the law should offer no
redress.
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sentatives" as a restrictive term of art intended to exclude judges,
but rather to parallel the all-inclusive language of § 2(a) and reach
all elected officials. The judiciary was rarely mentioned directly,
but these examples only serve to indicate that it was assumed that
the amended § 2, like the original, would continue to cover judicial
elections. For instance, Senator Orrin Hatch described the § 2 term
"political subdivision" as encompassing "all governmental units,
including city and county councils, school boards,7' 0 judicial districts, utility districts, as well as state legislatures.
The text of § 2 admits of no exception based on the function
performed by the official being elected. The amended § 2 grants
minorities no less protection in elections than did its predecessor.
The only change Congress made in 1982 was to adopt the results
test. Nowhere, including in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, is
there any support for a restricted reading of the term "representatives." A Congress intent on excluding judges would have done so
in the language, or would at least have mentioned it in the debates.
C.

The One Person, One Vote Doctrine

The courts that have refused to extend § 2 to judicial elections
argue that the word "representatives" cannot be construed to include elected judges. They point out that judges were excluded
from the coverage of the one person, one vote cases because they
are not representatives for purposes of that doctrine. Congress expressly restricted the scope of the results test to elections of "representatives." Because judges have been held to be outside the
scope of that word for purposes of the one person, one vote rule,
the argument is that Congress must have intended the same judicially determined definition when drafting § 2.
The weakness in the argument is that it imports a definition
from a line of cases that is legally and logically distinct from. the

[T]he standard is whether the political processes are equally "open" in that members
of a protected class have the same opportunity as others to participate in the political
process and to elect candidates of their choice.
LULAC, 914 F2d at 639 (Higginbotham concurring), quoting S Rep No 97-417 at 193
(court's emphasis).
"0 S Rep No 97-417 at 151 (emphasis added). The congressional record of the 1982
amendments also contains various references to judges, in the form of statistics presented to
Congress to indicate the progress made under the Act since 1965.
71 Gingles, 478 US at 44 (question under the results test is whether, "as a result of the
challenged practice or structure plaintiffs do not have an equal opportunity to participate in
the political processes and to elect candidates of their choice") (quoting S Rep No 97-417 at
28) (emphasis added).
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§ 2 protection against minority vote dilution. This Section first examines the one person, one vote cases on their own terms, and
then demonstrates that the conclusion that judges are not "representatives" for purposes of those cases does not demand the same
conclusion in the context of § 2.
1. The one person, one vote doctrine and judicial elections.
The one person, one vote doctrine requires that electoral districts be drawn so that they are substantially equal in population.72
In Reynolds v Sims, the Court held that districts that differed dramatically in population violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.7 3 The idea behind these cases was that
representatives must be elected by similar numbers of voters if
each individual voter is to have an equal voice in government. During the 1960s and 1970s, the Court defined the scope of the one
person, one vote rule by determining the elections to which it
would apply. In Hadley v Junior College District of Metropolitan
Kansas City, the Court specifically articulated the broad sweep of
the one person, one vote rule: "as a general rule, whenever a state
or local government decides to select persons by popular election
to perform governmental functions, [the one person, one vote doctrine applies].'
Courts have consistently held, however, that the one person,
one vote doctrine does not extend to judicial elections, even after
the seemingly all-inclusive language in Hadley. 5 In fact, in Wells v
Edwards,7 6 the Supreme Court affirmed without opinion a district
court's determination that the principle of one person, one vote
was not applicable to the judiciary. Justice White, joined by Justices Douglas and Marshall, vigorously dissented, arguing that the
broad language of Hadley did not create an exception for judicial
elections. 77 Nevertheless, in Wells, the Court implicitly endorsed

7'For the evolution of the doctrine, see Colegrove v Green, 328 US 549 (1946); Gomillion v Lightfoot, 364 US 339 (1960); Baker v Carr, 369 US 186 (1962); Gray v Sanders, 372
US 368 (1963); Wesberry v Sanders, 376 US 1 (1964). The rule was formally articulated in
Reynolds v Sims, 377 US 533 (1964).
73 377 US at 568.
74 397 US 50, 56 (1970).
75 See, for example, Buchanan v Gilligan, 349 F Supp 569, 571 (N D Ohio 1972); Holshouser v Scott, 335 F Supp 928, 932 (M D NC 1971), afl'd mem, 409 US 807 (1972).
71 347 F Supp 453, 454 (M D La 1972), af'd mem, 409 US 1095 (1973).
7 The district court had stated that it was "not unaware of the broad language of Hadley .... but [was] of the opinion that [this] exception... was contemplated by the Court in
Hadley." 347 F Supp at 454.
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the view that the apportionment cases had been founded on a theory of representation that did not apply to the judiciary.78
These decisions focused on the distinction between judges and
other elected officials. The courts, recognized that the one person,
one vote cases were predicated on a restricted notion of representation that excluded the judiciary.79 The foundational assumption
of the one person, one vote doctrine is that the elected official at
issue must act as the voice or advocate of a particular constituency.
The logic of the doctrine depends on the idea of representative as
partisan advocate. Only if an elected official is to be the voice of
her constituency does it make sense to say that each official must,
as a constitutional matter, be elected by substantially equal numbers of voters. If this were not the rule, it would be possible to give
certain individual voters less "representation," in the sense of having less of a "voice" in democratic government, by assigning them
fewer representatives.
It is precisely this underlying logic that led the courts to hold
the doctrine inapplicable to the judiciary. The doctrine is based on
a representative as a "voice" or "advocate." This concept of representation does not apply to judges, because elected judges are simply not meant to be advocates, partisans, or protectors of the special interests of a particular constituency. s0 The fact of election
does not alter the judicial role. Judges need not be elected by equal
numbers of people because they do not function as legislators or
executives. They owe no allegiance to a particular group of voters.
They owe only the duty to decide cases fairly and to interpret the
laws without bias. Because judges are not representatives within
the restrictive rationale of the one person, one vote cases, election
districts with equal populations are not constitutionally required
to maintain the legitimacy of these elections. Judges, then, are not

"The underlying logic of these decisions illustrates that "[t]he primary purpose of
one-man, one-vote apportionment is to make sure that each official member of an elected
body speaks for approximately the same number of constituents .... Thus, the rationale
behind the one-man, one-vote principle, which evolved out of efforts to preserve a truly
representative form of government, is simply not relevant to the makeup of the judiciary."
Id at 455.
7' See Stokes v Forston, 234 F Supp 575, 577 (N D Ga 1964) (per curiam). See also
Buchanan v Rhodes, 249, F Supp 860, 865 (N D Ohio 1966), appeal dismissed, 385 US 3
(1966), judgment vacated, 400 F2d 882 (6th Cir 1968).
80 Stokes, 234 F Supp at 577 (function of judges "is to administer the law, not to espouse the cause of a particular constituency"); Rhodes, 249 F Supp at 865 ("[W]e must
recognize one glaring distinction between the functions of legislators and the functions of
jurists. Judges do not represent people, they serve people."). -
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''representatives" in the sense that underlies and justifies the one
person, one vote rule.
There are other rational and important considerations that
can be taken into account by a state distributing its judges. These
concerns were another driving force behind the exemption of
judges from the one person, one vote rule.8 1 Case load, for instance,
determined by the volume and nature of litigation arising in various parts of the state, is often unrelated to population.2 An area
with fewer people but more litigation will need more judges. Thus,
as a practical matter, rigid application of the rule to judicial elections makes less sense than in other contexts; other criteria besides
population are relevant to judicial apportionment.
2.

One person, one vote and racial vote dilution.

Whether a judge is meant to function as a "representative" in
the traditional sense is a critical question. It was precisely this issue that the courts in the one person, one vote cases thought they
were confronting, and it was for this reason that they held the doctrine inapplicable to the judiciary. Those courts believed that the
requirement of equal population apportionment was founded on a
traditional concept of representation that by definition excluded
judges.
The Voting Rights Act is not so narrow. It addresses the concern of racial discrimination in voting and, more specifically, racial
vote dilution. This concern is just as relevant to judicial elections
as to any other. The original Act used broad, intrusive, and radical
measures to meet the serious problem of discrimination in voting.
The amendments continue this tradition. The 1982 amendments
make it easier to challenge an election scheme by making proof of
resulting dilution sufficient to establish a violation of the provision.
There was no reason for Congress to single out judicial elections
from this provision and there is no real evidence that it did so. The
use of the word "representatives," by all indications, was meant in
its general and not restricted sense. It was not meant to invoke a
grand debate over the nature of the judiciary. The conceptually
distinct nature of the one person, one vote and the racial vote dilution doctrines, as well as the case law developing the one person,
one vote doctrine, support this conclusion.
"1See New
NY 1967).
82 Id.

York State Ass'n of Trial Lawyers v Rockefeller, 267 F Supp 148, 154 (S D
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a) Two separate requirements. The courts that exempt
judges from § 2 do so primarily because the one person, one vote
doctrine exempts judges. For example, the en banc majority in LULAC viewed the one person, one vote cases as controlling.13 In fact,
the court felt that minority vote dilution depended on the idea of
individual vote dilution, "[f]or it is the assumption of substantial
equality (achieved through the guarantee of one-person, one-vote)
that underlies the concept of minority vote dilution."s4
This purported dependence is mistaken, however; it conflates
two separate requirements. The one person, one vote doctrine is a
constitutional requirement under the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. If districts are not substantially equal
in population, equal protection is violated. There is no need to go
further; the plaintiff is entitled to a remedy. However, the fact that
a particular election scheme comports with the one person, one
vote rule does not end the inquiry. Even schemes that pass the
first test must then be analyzed to ensure that they were not conceived and do not operate to dilute minority votes.
Protection against minority vote dilution, on the other hand,
is both constitutional and statutory, guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Fifteenth Amendment, and the Voting Rights
Act. The Constitution forbids racial vote dilution that is the result
of discriminatory intent, while § 2 reaches such dilution whenever
it occurs, regardless of the intent of those who devised or operate
the election scheme at issue. The fact that the one person, one vote
requirement and the minority dilution prohibition both derive
from the Fourteenth Amendment (the former in whole and the latter in part) does not make the second doctrine dependent on the
first. The requirement of equal population across districts and racial vote dilution are independent principles. The doctrines are
certainly related in some sense, but they cannot be said to depend
8 5
entirely or even substantially on each other.

83 Judge Gee wrote that the "Wells holding-that the one-person, one-vote rule does
not apply to the judiciary-leads inexorably to the conclusion that judicial elections cannot
be attacked along lines that their processes result in unintentional dilution of the voting
strength of minority members." 914 F2d at 627.
84 Id

at 628.

85 See id at 643 (Higginbotham concurring)' (Noting that the two doctrines "measure
equality on quite different planes. [One person, one vote] is facially neutral in the matter of
race; indeed compliance may adversely affect black voting power. [Racial vote dilution] rests
on core concerns of the Civil War amendments-submerging of minority voting strength by
the combined force of election methods and bigotry.").
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This distinction is recognized in many court opinions dealing
with voting rights in general and this issue in particular.8 6 In fact,
the Fifth Circuit itself has held as a general matter, in Voter Information v City of Baton Rouge, that even though the one person,
one vote doctrine exempted the judiciary, the distinct minority
vote dilution concept of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments applied to judges with full force.8 7 In Chisom, a Fifth Circuit panel cited this holding as support for its conclusion that the
racial dilution concept embodied in § 2 likewise extended to the
judiciary. 8 Both the Voter Information holding and its logical extension in Chisom recognize the distinction between the requirement of numerically equal voting districts and protection against
racial vote dilution.
It is universally accepted that a condition of racial vote dilution created by a judicial election scheme, which can be proven to
be caused by intentional discrimination, will be found to violate
the Constitution. This assumes, of course, that the condition of racial vote dilution can be identified as a preliminary matter, even in
absence of the separate requirement of one person, one vote. The
condition of racial dilution, once found to exist, must then be
shown to be the product of discriminatory intent under Mobile v
Bolden.
But proving the actual existence of the dilution is independent
of the process of proving that the existing dilution is caused by
discriminatory intent, as opposed to resulting merely from the
structure of the electoral scheme itself, regardless of the motives of
those who created it or who currently operate it. Holding that intentional vote dilution in judicial elections clearly violates the
Constitution compels the conclusion that such a condition is identifiable even though judicial districting plans are exempt from the
requirement of the one person, one vote rule. The preliminary application of the equal population principle, then, is in no sense a

"'See,

for example, Mallory, 839 F2d at 277-78; Chisom, 839 F2d at 1061.

97 Voter Information Project, Inc. v City of Baton Rouge, 612 F2d 208, 211 (5th Cir

1980):
To hold that a system designed to dilute the voting strength of black citizens and prevent the election of blacks as Judges is immune from attack would be to ignore both
the language and purpose of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. The Supreme
Court has frequently recognized that election schemes not otherwise subject to attack

may be unconstitutional when designed and operated to discriminate against racial
minorities.
98 839 F2d at 1061 ("It is difficult, if not impossible, for this Court to conceive of Con-

gress, in an express attempt to expand the coverage of the Voting Rights Act, to have in fact
amended the Act in a manner affording minorities less protection from racial discrimination
than that provided by the Constitution ....

).
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prerequisite for the existence and identification of racial vote
dilution.
Once this distinction is grasped, it becomes clear that the exemption of judges from the one person, one vote doctrine does not
prevent applying the vote dilution prohibition embodied in § 2 to
judicial elections. If it is possible to ascertain the existence of a
condition of racial dilution as a preliminary step in the proof of a
constitutional violation, then surely it must also be possible to
identify the same phenomenon in a § 2 case. The only difference in
the § 2 case is that the resulting minority vote dilution, once identified, is itself sufficient to establish a violation of the Voting
Rights Act. Under the Constitution, the existence of racial vote dilution is only evidence of the discriminatory intent required to
prove a constitutional violation. However, the process of identifying the actual condition known as racial vote dilution, and the nature of this phenomenon, are the same under both the Constitution and the Voting Rights Act. It therefore cannot be said that
the requirement of one person, one vote is in any sense a "benchmark" or a "baseline" without which it would be impossible to detect the existence of racial vote dilution resulting from either intentional discrimination or from some other characteristic or
combination of circumstances created by a particular districting
scheme."9
b) Judges; the one person, one vote precedents; and
LULAC. Given the precedents and the logic underlying them, it is
difficult to see why the majority in LULAC confuses the distinction between one person, one vote and racial vote dilution. In fact,
the LULAC majority goes so far as to say that it is a conceptual
impossibility to test for racial vote dilution where one person, one
vote does not apply because, the court claims, without the assumption of substantial equality of population, "there exists no yard89This issue arose when LULAC was argued before the Supreme Court. Some of the
Justices suggested that without the application of the one person, one vote doctrine, there is
no standard for deciding whether a minority group's votes have been diluted. Justice Scalia,
for instance, asked: "You don't know what watered beer is unless you know what beer is....
You need a standard. How do I know when a person of a different race has gotten less when
I don't have a base line?" Linda Greenhouse, High Court Hears Arguments on Election of
Judges, NY Times A17 (Apr 23, 1991). Solicitor General Starr correctly responded: "The
base line is set forth in the statute.... That is the congressionally mandated baseline." Id.
See note 29.
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stick by which to measure either the 'correct' magnitude of minority voting strength or the degree of minority vote dilution."9 0
The court's conflation of these two separate requirements
leads it seemingly to contradict itself. The court explicitly reaffirms the irrebuttable position that intentional minority vote dilution in a judicial election violates the Constitution, 91 yet it also
holds that the § 2 results test has no application in the absence of
the one person, one vote doctrine.2 Surely the court would not
have concluded that the original § 2, whose broad language was
held to be identical to the dictates of the Constitution, could not
apply to judges because one person, one vote did not apply. It is
difficult to see how the amended § 2 can be held not to apply to
the judiciary for precisely the same reason. To say that minority
vote dilution analysis cannot be entertained whenever one person,
one vote has been held not to apply makes no sense, for the same
reasons, under both the original and the amended text of § 2.
Indeed, the cases exempting judges from the one person, one
vote doctrine explicitly recognize the distinction between equality
of population and racial vote dilution. For example, in Holshouser
v Scott, the court expressly qualified its decision by stating that
the plaintiff "does not contend that there is discrimination in either the nominating process or the election process ....
We are
unable to find discrimination among voters or unequal weighing of
votes which would amount to arbitrary or capricious action or invidious distinctions. ' 93 The definition of "representatives" announced in these cases excluded judges, but the logic behind the
definition belies the assertion that it applies in the Voting Rights
Act context. The one person, one vote doctrine requires that election districts be substantially equal in population because of the
inherent arbitrariness of large population disparities in legislative
districts. Because of the pure representative function performed by
legislators, for instance, each vote must count equally, and any significant departure from equality in population is inherently arbitrary. Judges, on the other hand, fall outside the one person, one
vote doctrine because they do not fall within this pure definition of
representation. Population disparities in judicial districts, therefore, are not inherently arbitrary-there are rational factors other
90 914 F2d at 628.
' Id at 625 n 6.
9
3

Id at 627-28.

335 F Supp 928, 933 (M D NC 1971), aff'd mem, 409 US 807 (1972).
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than population that a jurisdiction may consider when apportioning judges. 4
The factors important in proving a § 2 violation, on the other
hand, are as relevant to judicial elections as to any other election.
These factors, which are listed in the Senate Report and are
viewed as authoritative by the courts, 95 include such issues as the
extent to which voting in elections in the state has been racially
polarized, the extent to which minorities have been elected to office, whether minorities have been denied access to the candidate
slating process, whether political campaigns have been characterized by subtle or overt racial appeals, and the extent to which the
state uses voting practices or procedures that may enhance the opportunity for racial discrimination." These indicia of racial discrimination or vote dilution apply equally to all elections, including judicial elections. As the Fifth Circuit has stated, "the various
'one man one vote' cases involving Judges make clear that they do
' 97
not involve claims of race discrimination as such.
Thus, the fact that judges do not "represent" constituents in
the traditional sense of the word is enough to exempt them from
coverage under the one person, one vote principle given the logical
foundations, purpose, and practical reality of that doctrine. So, it
can be true that judges need not be elected from districts of substantially equal populations. It does not follow, however, that a
state can draw districts that systematically dilute the votes of protected racial minority groups in judicial elections. Nor does it follow that these minority groups can do nothing about racial vote
dilution unless they can prove the "intent" necessary to meet the
requisite constitutional standard. This was precisely the reason
Congress amended § 2 in 1982. Reliance on the one person, one
vote line of cases in interpreting § 2 is misguided because the doctrines of population equality and racial vote dilution are conceptually different. 8 There is nothing about the character of a judicial
office that should allow states to dilute the votes of racial minority
groups in the election of judges, as opposed to other candidates.

See Gilligan, 349 F Supp at 571; Rhodes, 249 F Supp at 865. See also text at notes
81-82.
" Gingles, 478 US at 36-38, 43 n 7. See note 29.

" S Rep No 97-417 at 28-29.
97 Voter Information Project, 612 F2d at 211.

98See Southern Christian Leadership Conference v Siegelman, 714 F Supp 511, 520
(M D Ala 1989).
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III.

REMEDY IN SECTION

2

JUDICIAL ELECTION CASES

Closely tied to the question of whether § 2 applies to judicial
elections is the issue of how, if at all, courts should remedy violations in the judicial context. This Section demonstrates that the
remedial questions presented by § 2, while difficult, are not insoluble. The Section surveys the traditional remedy adopted in § 2
cases involving the judiciary-the safe minority subdistrict-and
argues that, while legitimate, it greatly increases the problems that
exist when a state chooses its judges by popular election. These
increased costs of judicial elections outweigh their benefits, both as
a general matter and as a mechanism for achieving diversity on the
state bench. Because courts generally allow states themselves to
suggest a remedial plan when a § 2 violation is found, this Section
concludes by arguing that the best remedy in these cases is for the
state to choose to return to an appointed judiciary. If implemented
properly, this remedy will achieve all of the goals of the Voting
Rights Act and avoid the "injustices" that courts find in other proposed remedies.
A.

The Remedial Dilemma

The word "representatives" in § 2 should be read broadly to
include the office of elected judge. Courts faced with this question
know that if they give § 2 its proper scope, they will have to apply
the results test for vote dilution to judicial districting plans. More
importantly, these courts will be faced with the difficult task of
crafting remedies for those judicial voting plans that violate § 2.
The practical and jurisprudential difficulties involved in interfering
with a state's method of selecting judges seems to be the critical
(but unspoken) factor behind those decisions excluding judges
from the scope of § 2. Courts recognize that extending § 2 to judges
may only "further polarize the voting blocs which currently exist,
and will almost certainly result in the removal from the bench of a
number of decent, fair, and competent state judges with many
years of dedicated service." 99 They point out that "there is a real
possibility that no fair, reasonable, and equitable remedy can ever
be fashioned to redress whatever section 2 violations may exist" in
these cases. 100 The courts fear that extending § 2 to judges may
remedy one injustice while creating another.' 0 '
" Id at 521.

100 Id.
101 Id.
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These remedial difficulties seem to influence the courts' substantive analysis on whether § 2 applies to judges. In fact, some
opinions even hold § 2 applicable to the state judiciary as a preliminary matter, but then rely on other interpretive devices to avoid
the remedial problem. For example, in his original panel majority
opinion in LULAC and his concurrence in the en banc rehearing of
the case, Judge Higginbotham argued that while § 2 applied, to
judges, it did not apply to all judges. Specifically, he would apply
the Act to judges who sit on a collegial court, but not to trial
judges who sit alone. In effect, Higginbotham's opinions, while
paying lip service to the strong statutory arguments in favor of applying § 2 to the judiciary, proceeded to carve out an exception
that as a practical matter excludes much of the judiciary from § 2.
The opinions rely on a distinction between multimember and
single-member offices first articulated in Butts v City of New
York. 02 The concept of the single-member office is founded on the
realization that there cannot be remediable vote dilution where
subdistricts in which a minority is dominant are physically impossible to draw.103 When an-office is filled by one person, a mayor or
governor for instance, there can be no partial "share"04 of the office
as there can be in the case of a multimember body.1
Judge Higginbotham took this distinction and recharacterized
its rationale. He argued that the relevant aspect of a single-member office is not that it is held by one person, o that subdistricts
are impossible to draw. Instead, the important characteristic is
that oie individual exercises the full authority of the office. 10 5 Because trial judges make decisions on their own, Judge Higginbotham characterized them as single-member offices. The fact that
there are many trial judges and that subdistricts could easily be
drawn was thought to be irrelevant.
Higginbotham's concurrence in LULAC, like the en banc majority's opinion, relies on untenable reasoning to avoid applying
§ 2. This avoidance seems to be based on a recognition of the difficult remedial question presented when § 2 is applied to the judiciary. Whatever the difficulties in crafting a remedy, however, it
must be recognized that the question of the applicability of § 2 is
202 779 F2d 141, 148 (2d Cir 1985). See also Dillard, 831 F2d at 251. For a discussion of

the distinction, see Pamela S. Karlan, Undoing the Right Thing: Single-Member Offices
and the Voting Rights Act, 77 Va L Rev 1 (1991); Note, 88 Mich L Rev 2199 (cited in note

5).

108 Siegelman, 714 F Supp at 519.
104
106

Butts, 779 F2d at 148.
LULAC, 914 F2d at 648-49 (Higginbotham concurring).
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logically distinct and should not be tainted by a results-oriented
fear of remedial problems. Courts that exclude the judiciary from
§ 2-whether on a wholesale basis or by misuse of the single-member concept as a "deus ex machina"-do damage to the statutory
structure of the Voting Rights Act.
B. Traditional Districting Remedies Under Section 2
Once a § 2 violation is established, the remedial plan almost
always involves the complicated redrawing of the district lines in
the challenged election. In § 2 cases, there is a general requirement, premised on federalism concerns, that defendant jurisdictions receive a chance to develop their own remedy, to which the
court should defer if it cures the violation. 106 If the defendant fails
to provide an adequate plan, courts usually fashion a remedy that
carves up the state into smaller districts, each electing one member
of the governmental body. One or some of these "subdistricts" will
contain a majority of a particular minority group sufficient to ensure that the group will be able to elect a representative of its
choice. The theory is that while under the old scheme it was possible to submerge all of the minority votes into the majority such
that the majority could override the choices of the minority and
elect all of the members of a governmental body, the new plan allows the minority to elect at least one member. For example, in a
scheme found to dilute the votes of blacks, at least one of the new
districts will consist of a black majority that will now be able to
elect a representative of its choice.
A few courts have approved remedies for judicial apportionment plans found to violate § 2. One of the first cases to deal with
the § 2 remedial issue in the context of the judiciary was Martin v
Mabus.10 7 The basic feature of the plan adopted by the court, the
"safe" minority subdistrict, was similar to § 2 remedies for legislative districts.10 8 The central focus of the remedy was the require106See, for example, Wise v Lipscomb, 437 US 535, 540 (1978) (plurality opinion);
Karlan, 77 Va L Rev at 12-13 (cited in note 102); Comment, Vote Dilution,Discriminatory
Results, and ProportionalRepresentation: What is the Appropriate Remedy for a Viola-

tion of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act?, 32 UCLA L Rev 1203, 1258-61 (1985).
107 700 F Supp 327 (S D Miss 1988). The court appointed an expert to devise a remedial plan only after the defendant jurisdiction proposed an unacceptable remedy that retained at-large, multimember districts. Id at 330-31.
108 Illinois recently adopted a similar plan for judicial districting. William Grady, Justice to Take on Local Flavor: County to Elect Resident Judges, Chicago Tribune § 2 at 1
(Feb 18, 1991). The salient feature of the scheme is the drawing of judicial "subcircuits,"
some of which will be safe minority districts. Legislators have not yet approved precise dis-
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ment that each judicial district should have at least one subdistrict
with a black majority population of sixty percent. 10 9 The court
found, however, that applying these policies to judicial as opposed
to legislative elections created some unique problems.
The Martin court focused first on the overall characteristics of
the proposed districts. It recognized that one person, one vote did
not apply, so equal population across districts was not required.
Nevertheless, the remedy sought to minimize population variances
among subdistricts as a matter of "general equity."" Furthermore, the traditional redistricting factors of contiguity, compactness, community of interest, natural boundaries, and preservation
of existing lines were considered. The court found, however, that
the communities of interest are different in judicial than in legislative elections. Because severe campaign restrictions are placed on
candidates in judicial elections, attorneys will be known only by
their home communities, rather than by their entire districts. The
court was therefore hesitant to split towns and counties."' The
court also recognized that the value of incumbency was greater in
judicial than in legislative elections. It refrained, however, from intentionally favoring sitting judges, relying instead on the voters'
ability to favor future incumbents in the new subdistricts. 112
Under the plan, judges would be elected from single-member
subdistricts within each district, but would have jurisdiction over
the entire district. The court refused to implement a subdistrict
residency requirement for two reasons. First, residency is appropriate for legislators who should be close to their constituents, but
this is not true of judicial officers. Judges, unlike legislators, do not
serve their subdistricts; they serve the district as a whole by applying the law "in an unbiased manner rather than representing their
supporters.""' Second, a residency requirement was difficult because of the low number (or perhaps absence) of statutorily qualitrict lines, but the new subcircuits are projected to include four predominantly black districts, four predominantly suburban districts, four "ethnic Democratic" districts, and a Hispanic district. The plan will be phased in gradually, so that sitting judges will not be
removed from the bench immediately. The goal of the plan is to diversify the state judiciary
and the chief means employed is the safe minority district.
109 There was a disagreement over what size the percentage majority should be in the
black subdistricts. It centered on whether registration and turnout rates should be accounted for. The court held that a sixty percent population would allow blacks in the subdistrict to elect a candidate of their choice. Martin, 700 F Supp at 333.
110 Id at 332.

1 Id at 332-33.
Id.
13 Id.
12

1991]

Judicial Elections

fled candidates in each subdistrict. The plan, therefore, required
residency only in the district as a whole. The defining characteristic of the remedy, though, was the safe minority subdistrict.
C.

Costs of Traditional Districting Remedies

The safe subdistrict remedy imposes substantial costs on
states that choose judges by election. In short, these remedies create the impression among voters and judges that the judges are in
some sense the voice of their constituencies. Some would argue
that this is precisely the result intended by the Voting Rights
Act-that the conclusion that judges are "representatives" is necessarily tied to the view that judges ought to be responsive to their
"constituents."
This Comment rejects that view. The existence of an elected
judiciary does not change the conception of the proper role of the
judiciary. States that adopt an electoral system do so because of
dissatisfaction with appointment, not because they intend to alter
the fundamentally independent and unbiased nature of the judiciary. Unfortunately, the traditional safe subdistrict remedy compromises the independence of the judiciary.
1. The elected judiciary and the judicial function.
The argument that judges must not act as advocates for a constituency assumes a certain conception of the proper role of the
judiciary. If it is to remain legitimate, the judicial power must be
exercised in an unbiased manner. A partisan judiciary fighting for
a particular agenda or the "rights" of a specific group is nothing
less than tyrannical. Judges, to paraphrase Hamilton, can exercise
neither force nor will but merely judgment. 114 However, what are
we to make of a judiciary selected by popular election?
The rationale for moving to an elected judiciary was not based
on some idea that the traditional independent nature of the judiciary should change or that judges should "represent" constituencies
that elect them in the same sense that legislators do. Rather, it was
prompted by a dissatisfaction with the type of people that were
being selected to serve as judges. Judicial elections were a Populist
response to a concern that judges were too frequently appointed
114 Federalist 78 (Hamilton), in Clinton Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers 464, 465
(New Am Library, 1961).
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from the privileged classes, and that the appointment system was
not particularly designed to improve justice. 115
This initial politicizing of the bench, however, met with almost
immediate dissatisfaction of another sort that resulted in a series
of reforms to minimize political influences on the judiciary.""
These reforms included non-partisan elections and merit selection.
Merit selection was an attempt to combine the benefits and minimize the costs of both election and appointment. Under the merit
plan judges are appointed (by the governor and perhaps some nonpolitical nomination commission) and occasionally stand for retention election, in which voters decide only whether the judge should
remain in office. If the judge is rejected, another is appointed to fill
the vacancy." 7 This plan is thought to provide the benefits of
knowledgeable selection of qualified jurists, the minimization of
political influences, and the ability of people to exercise some control over those who would undertake the duties of this branch of
government." 8
Popular election provides the benefit of allowing the people to
choose directly those who will exercise the judicial power. In that
sense it satisfies the democratic urge to select government officials
by popular vote. However, elections do not change the qualities
that are important in a good judge. Elections merely change the
people responsible for assessing whether and to what degree a particular candidate possesses these relevant characteristics. The
democratic pedigree of elected judges is purer than that of appointed judges in the sense that the former are selected directly by
the people, rather than indirectly by executives or legislators representing the people. It is precisely this characteristic, however,
that gives rise to the significant costs of electing judges. These
costs, it is thought, consist of the sacrificing of both the independence and quality of the state judiciary." 9
118 No state had an elected judiciary at the time of the framing of the Constitution.
Lower court judges were first elected in Georgia in 1812, but Mississippi was the first state
to adopt a completely elected judiciary in 1832. Glenn R. Winters, Selection of Judges-An
HistoricalIntroduction,44 Tex L Rev 1081, 1082 (1966). See also LULAC, 914 F2d at 63536 (Higginbotham concurring).
116 Id at 1083. Instead of implementing reforms, some states, including Virginia and
Mississippi, simply returned to appointment after unfavorable early experiences with
elections.
'1

Id at 1084.

1 Id. Another benefit would be "the reminder to the elected judge that he is the people's servant and not their master." Id.
19
For additional discussion of the history of state judicial selection in the United
States, see Harry P. Stumpf, American Judicial Politics 153-88 (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1988).
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2. Traditional
function.

remedies

and

inroads into the judicial

The chief costs of electing the judiciary are the politicization
and loss of independence that the jurisdictions selecting that
method of choosing judges have sought to minimize. When judges
are forced to stand for election, they are in danger of being perceived (or worse, perceiving themselves) as partisans advancing a
particular agenda. In addition, judges are exposed to the compromising pressure of the political process, which interferes with the
ability to decide cases fairly and objectively. Judges must solicit
contributions in order to run for reelection, creating at least the
appearance of or the potential for impropriety. 120 More importantly, since the judge owes her job to the current majority, she is
potentially affected by the wishes of that majority. This conflicts
with the judge's
role as protector of minorities against majority
1
tyranny.

12

The problem with the traditional "safe subdistrict" remedy is
that it exacerbates the costs already associated with an elective
system. Several aspects of the traditional remedy contribute to the
politicization of the judiciary. First, the actual drawing of the districts will be a complicated and hotly debated issue. The complexity of the process will allow other silent agendas to come into play.
In Illinois, for instance, Republican legislators strongly support the
recent plan because they hope to draw suburban districts that will
assure more Republican judges. 22 The goal of minority representation thus can provide an effective trojan horse for political gerrymanderers. The safe subdistrict remedy also serves to further politicize the elected judiciary. Line drawing becomes a partisan fight
to get more "partisan" judges. This feeds the illegitimate view of
the elected judge as advocate.
Second, electing judges with statewide jurisdiction from small
subdistricts increases the appearance of and potential for bias.
What happens, for example, when a judge hears a case between a
120 The ABA has designed provisions to limit these improprieties in judicial elections.
See ABA Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 7, reprinted in Thomas D. Morgan and Ronald
D. Rotunda, 1990 Selected Statutes on Professional Responsibility 341, 353-55 (Founda-

tion, 1990).
"I

For an extended analysis of the relative merits of appointment versus election, see

Stumpf, American JudicialPolitics at 166-78 (cited in note 119); Philip L. DuBois, From
Ballot to Bench: JudicialElections and the Quest for Accountability (Texas, 1980). For a

particularly interesting historical perspective, see Lamar T. Beman, Election Versus Appointment of Judges (4 The Reference Shelf No 2) (H.W. Wilson, 1926).
Ill Grady, Justice to Take on Local Flavor (cited in note 108).
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prominent citizen from his subdistrict who contributes to his campaign fund and a citizen from another subdistrict who cannot even
cast a ballot in the next election? The concern here is not the presence of actual biased decisions. The real problem, as in federal diversity policy, is the potential loss of popular confidence in the judicial branch. Popular belief that the courts are biased, regardless
of whether they in fact are, will severely impair the effective functioning of the judiciary.
Third, the traditional remedy further magnifies bias concerns;
the resulting smaller subdistricts increase the political accountability of the judiciary. Because the judge must stand before a smaller
group of voters, the political pressure exerted to decide cases consistent with the views of the majority in that community is potentially much greater. Judges themselves are more likely to be influenced because it would be much easier for a particular decision to
be mischaracterized, propagandized, and disseminated to a smaller
electorate. Again, a judge's decision might not actually be influenced in this way, but the cost incurred is the substantially increased probability of such influence created by the increased political pressures of the new subdistricts.
Fourth, these remedial plans not only draw smaller districts,
they also create "white," "black," and "Hispanic" judicial districts.
This fuels the notion that judges elected from these subdistricts
are advocates of their respective constituencies while on the bench.
This concept is created by the two sides of the § 2 coin. It protects
participation and guarantees results, and these two policy concerns
are difficult to separate. The suggestion is that predetermined outcomes are the best way to protect unimpaired equal participation.
So the remedial goal is to give minorities more elected officials by
drawing districts that will ensure this. This policy, however wise in
the legislative context, has been imported into judicial districting
without distinguishing the distinct role played by the judge. Such a
plan massages an illegitimate conception of the judiciary into the
consciousness of the populace: it perpetuates the idea that judges
are partisan advocates as opposed to unbiased arbiters. It enforces
the idea by injecting the politics of racial separation into the process of judicial selection-the idea that blacks and Hispanics must
have their own judges and whites theirs.
While this may not be a stated goal of the remedy, it is undeniably a direct implication. This notion is further supported because it appears that it is not sufficient under the Act that black or
Hispanic judges are elected to the bench. On the contrary, the Act
seems to require that minority judges must be elected by minority
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districts. 2 ' If widely accepted, this assumption could destroy the
effective functioning of the judiciary, because it uses racial criteria
to address the problem of race-based politics. The purported
"cure," then, is simply more of the disease. It gives rise to troubling questions, because it presumes that minorities cannot get fair
treatment in the courts unless there are minority judges, elected by
minorities, on the bench. The implication is that the judiciary is
inherently prejudiced.
But will this problem, if it indeed exists, be solved by simply
diversifying the judiciary as a whole? To assure proper balance,
won't cases need to be assigned by the racial makeup of the litigants, the judges, or both? Will it require "racially balanced" appeals panels? Will defendants have to be tried by judges of their
own race? Once the idea of biased judges is accepted-and indeed
the entire structure of the remedy feeds this idea-the seeds of the
judiciary's destruction are sown. This is not to suggest that there
are not legitimate reasons for promoting diversity on the bench.
Rather, attempting to achieve diversity through safe subdistricting
is promoting diversity for the wrong reasons: such a remedy diversifies the judiciary at the price of destroying its legitimacy.
D.

Return to Appointment

Once a § 2 violation is found, the court allows the affected jurisdiction to offer a remedial plan. The court must accept the plan
if it solves the § 2 problem, even if the court itself would have
chosen another remedy. A state faced with this choice should remedy the problem by returning to an appointive system of judicial
selection. The alternative safe subdistrict remedial plan introduces
new costs into the equation that swamp any benefits previously realized from selecting judges by popular election. If implemented
properly, an appointive system can achieve the legitimate policy
goals of the Voting Rights Act with respect to judges, and avoid
the substantial costs of any subdistrict plan. While a return to appointment raises some concerns that need to be addressed, it provides the best solution to this difficult problem.

ItS

See The Wrong Minority, Wall St J A14 (April 29, 1991). This editorial discusses

the example of Faith Johnson who was one of the first black criminal court judges in Dallas.
If a current voting rights suit is successful, Judge Johnson's job will probably be dissolved as
part of the remedy because she "is the 'wrong kind' of minority. She happens to be a Re-

publican." Roland Rios, the lawyer challenging the Dallas judicial districts, claims that
Judge Johnson and others like her cannot "represent" minorities since "98% of blacks and
80% of Hispanics vote Democratic." Id.
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The benefits of appointment and legitimate diversity.

Appointment will prevent the difficulties presented by subdistrict remedies. It will remove the political pressure on judges created by a small, specialized electorate. Of course, appointment
would not be completely free of politics, but the pressures would
be far less than in popular elections. If judges are appointed for
life, judicial independence will be further protected.
More importantly for purposes of § 2, though, diversity can be
promoted through the appointment process. There are both legitimate and illegitimate reasons for promoting diversity on the
bench. It is illegitimate to desire diversity so that any particular
group will have -a voice or an advocate in the judiciary. This is
founded on an unacceptable view of the proper role of a judge. Diversity is, however, desirable for other reasons. First, diversity increases public confidence in the objectivity and fairness of the
bench. Positive public perception is essential to the efficacy of the
judiciary. There is also some "role model" benefit to having minorities on the bench. Furthermore, diversity brings different perspectives to the bench, at least to the extent that race is a valid proxy
for perspective. This is not to say that such candidates take judicial positions with the idea of promoting an agenda or serving a
constituency. Instead, the idea is that judges will remain unbiased,
but that perspective will come to bear in some way on their decisions. In any event, agreement with all of these rationales for diversity is not essential. All that is necessary is support for diversity
for some reason other than a desire to transform the judiciary into
a subjective, partisan institution under the control of the
electorate.
Assuming that the state officials appointing judges have been
elected pursuant to plans that comport with the Voting Rights Act,
an appointive system indirectly preserves the § 2 pedigree of
judges. These decisionmakers can promote diversity by making
race one among many factors considered when selecting a qualified
candidate. The independence of these judges will be protected, and
the potential that they will be perceived (or will perceive themselves) as advocates for a particular interest group will be minimized. If diversity is a significant concern of voters, whose voice in
the legislative and executive branches has been guaranteed by § 2,
then it will come to bear on those officials responsible for judicial
appointments. More importantly, the particular method of appointment implemented must be designed to give minorities an adequate voice in the appointment process. Changing to an appoin-
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tive system will also allow states to avoid the injustice and
inefficiencies of removing qualified and experienced judges from
the bench in large numbers. New judges can simply be appointed
as vacancies become available.
2. Potential
remedy.

negative

ramifications

of the appointment

The remedy of appointment has its problems, of course. First,
it gives rise to federalism concerns. Although the state itself
"chooses" the remedy, states that have decided to select their
judges by election will be "encouraged" by the courts to change to
an appointive system. The choices of the states will be reversed by
federal policy. In some sense, this remedy is more intrusive than a
new districting plan because it does not merely modify but completely alters the selection method adopted by the state. However,
because the states have the first chance at formulating a remedy,
the ultimate choice remains with them. Granted, the federal policy
alters the incentives inherent in the choice and counsels a move to
appointment, but such a change is in no way mandatory. Federal
policies often create incentives without expressly requiring states
to take certain specific actions. The choice to elect judges was
made in a pre-§ 2 world. Section 2 alters the costs and benefits of
the choice in such a way as to make the "costs" of elective selection prohibitive.
A second concern is that the remedy arguably ignores discrimination. A court finds that an election scheme violates the Voting
Rights Act and the response is to take away voting for the office
altogether. Such a plan may appear to avoid, not solve, the problem. But a districting scheme that violates § 2 is not necessarily,
nor even probably, the result of discrimination. The results test
sweeps far more broadly, reaching plans that result in dilution for
whatever reason. Further, the state has the right to decide how it
will select its judges. While it is certainly true that if elections are
used, they must conform to the dictates of the Voting Rights Act,
judicial elections are not and cannot be required by the federal
government consistent with federalism.
In addition, any initial displeasure with the change will dissipate when and if appointment succeeds in diversifying the bench.
To the extent that this cost exists, then, it is temporary. This, of
course, will require state politicans adopting this course of action
to eschew myopic concerns and focus on the long run. Again, the
officials responsible for judicial selection will be elected by means
consistent with the Voting Rights Act. If the appointive system
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does not achieve diversity as well as anticipated, there is always
recourse to the democratic process to speed up progress. Finally,
were the system to fail completely, elections always remain an option. However, to the extent that the relative costs of the two systems can be determined ex ante, it seems that the appointive system will achieve the goals of the Act and minimize the costs of
electing judges in general and § 2 remedial districting plans in
particular.
Two more brief points must be mentioned. First, there may be
a complication if the jurisdiction at issue is covered under § 5 of
the Act. In that case, all changes, including a return to appointment, 12 4 must be precleared. Therefore, implementation of the appointment remedy will have to overcome an additional hurdle.
This hurdle may be so significant that many covered jurisdictions
will not be able to return to appointment on their own decision or
in response to a § 2 lawsuit. However, denying a state its right to
select its judiciary by appointment presents severe problems of
federalism. In any event, this would be an extremely important,
and perhaps prohibitive, consideration for jurisdictions covered
under § 5.
The second concern is with the jurisdiction that is found to
have violated § 2, but refuses to offer an acceptable remedial plan.
In that case, the court would have to draft a remedy. It would be
improper, again for reasons of federalism, for a federal court to
force a state to change to arn appointive system. A court in this
position would simply have to implement the usual safe subdistrict
remedial plan. This Comment advocates a policy choice that makes
sense given the circumstances, but it is a decision that can be made
only by the states themselves. It can neither be made for them nor
taken away from them. A state that refuses to offer a proper remedy for a § 2 violation will incur all of the costs inherent in the
subdistrict remedy, but it will have made its own bed.
CONCLUSION

The plain language, structure, and statutory purpose of § 2 of
the Voting Rights Act applies to judicial elections; the one person,
one vote cases do not refute this analysis. But the application of
§ 2 presents unique remedial difficulties. This Comment has
sketched out some of the problems that arise when the safe subdistrict plan is employed in judicial election cases. The subdistrict
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See Allen v State Board of Elections, 393 US 544 (1969).
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remedy may serve only to intensify the negative aspects of popular
election, which undermine the effectiveness and independence of
the judiciary. States faced with the remedial decision should implement an appointive system of judicial selection. If designed and
implemented properly, appointment will achieve the goals of the
Voting Rights Act and avoid the costs of subdistricting that
threaten to destroy the legitimacy of the judicial branch of state
government.

